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Abstract 
 
This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that 
obtain financing from both a “relationship” bank and “arm’s-length” banks. We find 
that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity 
among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information 
precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low 
expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high 
expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if 
the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large 
degree. 
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 1 Introduction
In many countries, ﬁrms rely on multiple bank ﬁnancing. Particularly small- and medium-
sized European ﬁrms often obtain ﬁnancing from several banks of which one may be special
in the sense of a so-called “relationship bank”. Early theoretical work on relationship lending
usually saw the relationship bank as the only source of ﬁnancing for the ﬁrm. Relation-
ship banking has been characterized by long-term relations between bank and customer, a
large proportion of total ﬁrm debt held by the relationship bank, and preferred access to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (Fischer, 1990, Elsas, 2004). Potential advantages of relationship
lending, such as increased credit availability, intertemporal smoothing of ﬁnancing conditions,
and more eﬃcient credit decisions for borrowers facing ﬁnancial distress, seem to beneﬁt in
particular small, young, and innovative ﬁrms that are informationally opaque (Sharpe, 1990,
Rajan, 1992, Petersen and Rajan, 1995). These ﬁrms typically need to ﬁnance projects whose
returns are positive only in the long-run and often lack a suﬃcient track-record to obtain
ﬁnancing from the capital markets. However, the hold-up costs associated with a relation-
ship bank’s informational advantage and the ensuing bargaining power may be suﬃciently
severe to prevent single relationship banking and therefore promote borrowing from multiple
“arm’s-length” lenders (Von Thadden, 1992, Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996, Detragiache et al.,
2000).
The clear-cut results regarding beneﬁts and drawbacks of relationship banking notwithstand-
ing, recent empirical work agreed that ﬁrms very often rely on multiple bank ﬁnancing with
a mixture of both relationship and arm’s-length lending (Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting, 1998, Ongena
and Smith, 2000, Machauer and Weber, 2001). For German data, Brunner and Krahnen
(2001) ﬁnd that the average number of bank relationships is 6 (with a minimum of 1 and a
maximum of 30). For a cross-section of European ﬁrms, Ongena and Smith (2000) report the
average number of bank relationships for instance for Italy as 15.2 and for France as 11.3,
with a maximum for the whole data set of 70. Further studies indicate that the number of
bank relationships increases in ﬁrm size and decreases in the existence of a relationship bank
(Ongena and Smith, 2000, Machauer and Weber, 2000, Brunner and Krahnen, 2001).
Even though a wide-spread phenomenon, until recently multiple bank ﬁnancing has rarely
been scrutinized in theoretical work. One of the ﬁrst papers trying to establish the optimal
debt structure in a model of multiple asymmetric bank ﬁnancing derived the optimal struc-
ture from the tradeoﬀ between the bargaining power of a relationship bank and the risk of
coordination failure from (symmetric) multiple banking (Elsas et al., 2004). It thereby com-
plemented earlier work on coordination failure in credit markets by Hubert and Sch¨ afer (2002)
and Morris and Shin (2004) by a richer structure of bank types. Whereas Morris and Shin
(2004) examined coordinating behavior among small, homogeneous lenders only, Hubert and
Sch¨ afer (2002) diﬀerentiated between small and large creditors, but analyzed the strategies of
the diﬀerent creditor types in separate models. Elsas et al. (2004) were the ﬁrst to account
for the coexistence of a relationship bank lender with various (homogeneous) small banks.
In contrast to the work mentioned so far, this paper investigates the consequences of a het-
erogeneous multiple banking regime rather than establishing the optimal ﬁnancing structure.
Similarly to the model by Elsas et al. (2004), we emphasize a relationship bank’s coordinating
role among a multitude of arm’s-length banks. In our model, however, coordination eﬀects are
due to both the relationship bank’s substantial fraction of debt and her superior information2
about the ﬁrm’s business prospects, whereas Elsas et al. (2004) put more emphasis on the
relationship bank’s bargaining power and disregard her informational advantages. Taking the
ﬁnancing structure as given, we are particularly interested in the way heterogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing inﬂuences ﬁrms’ risk-taking with regard to the funded business projects and
the optimal information disclosure to the relationship bank.
Aspects of optimal risk- and information-policy have also been analyzed by Bannier and Heine-
mann (2005) for a central bank trying to prevent a coordinated attack on a ﬁxed currency.
Similarly to our work, Heinemann and Metz (2002) examined the optimal policy-mix for a
ﬁrm that aims at minimizing the probability of a liquidity crisis via early withdrawal of credit
by a continuum of homogeneous lenders. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms optimally choose maximum
risk when the expected project cash-ﬂow is low, but select zero risk for projects with high
expected cash-ﬂows. In either case, ﬁrms disclose information of maximum precision. The
current paper extends this earlier work by assuming a richer structure of creditor types. The
model is built around a ﬁrm that holds credit relations to several small banks and one rela-
tionship bank. Furthermore, whereas the paper by Heinemann and Metz (2002) was limited
to ﬁrms with large collateral, the current study considers both ﬁrms with large and small
collateral. As such, we complement the earlier work by focussing additionally on small- and
medium-sized ﬁrms that typically dispose of only low collateral.
Our results indicate that optimal ﬁrm policy is indeed contingent on the level of collateral and
on the ﬁrm’s business prospects. For lowly-collateralized ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that, regarding projects
with low expected cash-ﬂows, optimal risk-taking depends on the degree of relationship lending
relative to arm’s-length lending. If the relationship bank grants a suﬃciently large proportion
of total ﬁrm debt, the ﬁrm will choose maximum business risk. For a low proportion of
relationship lending, in contrast, the ﬁrm optimally decides on minimum project risk. Projects
with high expected cash-ﬂows, in contrast, will always be conducted with minimum risk.
Larger ﬁrms, that are usually highly collateralized, show a diﬀerent risk-taking behavior.
They vary business risk along with the degree of relationship lending only for projects with
high expected cash-ﬂows. Whenever the relationship bank’s stake in total ﬁrm debt is large,
the ﬁrm will conduct a project with minimum business risk, but will decide on intermediate
riskiness if the relationship bank’s proportion of total ﬁrm debt is low. For projects with
low expected cash-ﬂows, in contrast, the ﬁrm will decide on maximum risk. Comparing
these results on highly-collateralized ﬁrms with the earlier ﬁndings by Heinemann and Metz
(2002), we see that the ﬁnancing structure has a decisive inﬂuence on optimal ﬁrm policy for
projects with high expected cash-ﬂows. Whereas homogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing will
then always induce highly-collateralized ﬁrms to choose minimum business risk, they will do
so in a heterogeneous ﬁnancing regime only if the degree of relationship banking is suﬃciently
high.
With regard to optimal information policy, our model indicates that ﬁrms with low collateral
will provide their relationship bank with minimally precise information about projects with
low expected cash-ﬂow whenever the fraction of relationship lending is suﬃciently large, and
disclose fully precise information in any other case. Firms with large collateral will deviate
from an information disclosure of maximum precision only for projects with high expected
cash-ﬂows if the relationship bank’s fraction of ﬁrm debt is low.
Our results also have implications for the eﬃciency of ﬁrms’ businesses. We demonstrate that3
minimum business risk, combined with fully precise information disclosure to the relationship
bank, maximizes ex-ante welfare as it virtually eliminates the incidence of ineﬃcient project
liquidation. Choosing maximum risk, in contrast, may merely reduce the ex-ante probability
of liquidation, but never eliminates it completely. As such, heterogeneous multiple bank
ﬁnancing may help lowly-collateralized ﬁrms to reach maximum eﬃciency for projects with
low expected cash-ﬂows, i.e. eliminate the ex-ante probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation,
provided that the degree of relationship banking is not too high. For highly-collateralized
ﬁrms, in contrast, a heterogeneous ﬁnancing regime can never be advantageous compared to
homogeneous multiple banking. We may summarize our ﬁndings by stating that in a system of
heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing ex-ante eﬃciency is highest if ﬁrms with low collateral
rely on relationship banking to a relatively low extent, while ﬁrms with high collateral employ
a large degree of relationship lending.
Aspects of eﬃcient project choice have also been analyzed by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
They show that multiple bank ﬁnancing, or “decentralization” in their notation, can lead
to eﬃcient project selection when creditors dispose of asymmetric information about project
quality. In contrast to our study, however, the credit market structure is derived endogenously
as a homogeneous ﬁnancing regime, whereas we impose a quite restrictive, but to our mind
nevertheless reasonable, banking structure with one relationship bank and various arm’s-
length banks.
Our model essentially analyzes optimal ﬁrm policy with regard to both the conduct of busi-
ness projects and the corresponding ﬁnancing of projects. A study by von Rheinbaben and
Ruckes (2004), in contrast, concentrates mainly on the ﬁnancing side. They examine a ﬁrm’s
optimal choice of the number of creditors and the extent of information disclosed to them.
Their results are based on the trade-oﬀ between lower credit costs due to the disclosure of
precise information and lower expected operating returns following from information leaks to
competitors. They ﬁnd that highly rated ﬁrms disclose only little information, whereas ﬁrms
with low ratings have to disclose very precise information in order to reduce creditors’ uncer-
tainty about their projects. These results may be compared to our ﬁndings with regard to
highly-collateralized ﬁrms that tend to be large, and most often rated, ﬁrms. Assuming that
high ratings correspond to high expected ﬁrm proﬁts, our model states that ﬁrms with low rat-
ings provide their relationship bank with completely precise information, whereas ﬁrms with
high ratings optimally disclose information of only intermediate or even minimal precision,
depending on the degree of relationship lending. The similarity of results notwithstanding,
information disclosure in our model only aﬀects the relationship bank, whereas in the model
by von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) information is disclosed to all creditors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of het-
erogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing. Section 3 derives the unique equilibrium, the subsequent
section concentrates on basic comparative static results. Section 5 ﬁnally analyzes optimal
risk-taking and information disclosure for a ﬁrm that aims at reducing ineﬃcient project
liquidation. Section 6 concludes.4
2 The Model
We consider a simple model where the economy consists of three types of agents: a ﬁrm, a
relationship bank and a continuum of arm’s-length banks.1 The ﬁrm plans to run a project
with stochastic returns that matures within two time periods. As the ﬁrm has no funds
available to ﬁnance the project, she has to resort to debt ﬁnancing. In an intermediate stage
of the game, lenders may withdraw their loans prematurely, so that the ﬁrm is threatened by
early liquidation of the project.
The bank ﬁnancing system is heterogeneous in two respects: ﬁrst, arm’s-length banks dispose
of less precise information about the project than the relationship bank. Second, each of the
arm’s-length lenders grants only a negligible fraction of the full loan to the ﬁrm,2 whereas
the relationship lender’s proportion of total ﬁrm debt is of non-negligible size. In particular,
the relationship bank’s fraction of total debt amounts to proportion ¸, while the small banks
provide a combined proportion of 1 ¡ ¸ of the full credit. Parameter ¸ is therefore also
taken to characterize the degree of heterogeneity among the involved banks.3 With regard
to banks’ information about the project, it is assumed that the relationship bank observes
a private signal, xR, about project quality µ, with xRjµ » N(µ; 1
c), whereas small banks
observe individual private signals of xSjµ » N(µ; 1
b). Noise in private signals is supposed to
be mutually independent and independent of µ. Moreover, c ¸ b, so that the relationship
bank’s private information is at least as precise as any small bank’s signal. The distribution
of private signals is common knowledge.
The complete structure of the game is as follows:
1. In t = 0, the ﬁrm approaches the banks in order to request ﬁnancing for a business
project. It oﬀers a repayment of r at maturity (t = 2). Based on successful ﬁnancing
decisions,4 the ﬁrm engages in a risky project. It chooses a level of risk that leads to
a variance of project cash-ﬂow of 1=a and commits to providing the relationship bank
with information of precision c. Afterwards, nature selects project quality µ from the
commonly known distribution N(y;1=a). The selected quality µ becomes known to the
ﬁrm’s managers but remains unobservable to bank lenders.
2. In t = 1, banks receive private information about µ. Simultaneously, they have to decide
whether to extend or withdraw their loans. At the same time, the ﬁrm has to decide
whether to commit to additional eﬀort V that is necessary for successful completion of
the project in t = 2, or to terminate the project altogether. The decision to undertake
additional eﬀort is tied to reﬁnancing the withdrawn fraction of debt.
3. In t = 2, project cash-ﬂow is realized and equals µ if the ﬁrm did invest and reﬁnance.
1The assumption of a continuum of arm’s-length banks is made for simplicity. It can be shown that a ﬁnite
number of banks does not qualitatively impair the results. See also Morris and Shin (2003)
2Arm’s-length banks are therefore also referred to as “small” banks.
3The higher ¸, the larger the proportion of (well-informed) relationship lending relative to (less well-
informed) arm’s-length lending. For the extreme cases of ¸ = 1 and ¸ = 0, the model considers single
relationship banking and homogeneous multiple banking, respectively.
4We abstract from the banks’ decision of whether or not to grant a loan to the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage of
the game. The banks’ strategic choice comprises solely the question of whether or not to withdraw the loan
prematurely, i.e. in t = 1.5
Otherwise the project fails and credit cannot be repaid. The ﬁnal liquidation value of
assets is assumed to be zero.
Early withdrawal of capital in t = 1 leads to a liquidation value of K (< r) per unit of capital
invested. K is also referred to as collateral.5 Reﬁnancing capital withdrawn by small banks
costs the ﬁrm WS, reﬁnancing the relationship bank’s fraction of debt leads to costs of WR
per unit of capital. In order to take account of a potential hold-up problem, we assume that
0 · r < WS < WR · 1. Hence, even though we abstract from a bargaining process between
ﬁrm and relationship bank, it is more costly to reﬁnance the relationship bank’s fraction of
debt than the small banks’.
3 Derivation of Equilibrium
Essentially, the depicted model presents a global game in the sense of Carlsson and van
Damme (1993), where each player noisily observes the game’s payoﬀ structure, which itself is
determined by a random draw from a given class of games. Following the solution method of
Morris and Shin (2003, 2004), we derive a unique equilibrium in trigger strategies, based on
players’ indiﬀerence conditions, provided that private information is suﬃciently precise.6
Starting from a process of backwards induction, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
exerting eﬀort and reﬁnancing the withdrawn parts of credit on the one hand and terminating
the project on the other hand, if
¼F(eﬀort and reﬁnancejµ) = ¼F(terminatejµ)
µ ¡ V ¡ ¸r prob(x ¸ x¤
Rjµ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)r prob(x ¸ x¤
Sjµ)
¡¸WR prob(x < x¤
Rjµ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)WS prob(x < x¤
Sjµ) = 0 :
Here, it is assumed that the relationship bank follows a trigger strategy around a signal value
of x¤
R, so that she withdraws her part of credit whenever xR < x¤
R and extends credit for
xR ¸ x¤
R. Likewise, the small banks are supposed to follow trigger strategies around a signal
value of x¤
S.7 The ﬁrm will then optimally terminate the project for all project values lower
than µ¤, while she will invest eﬀort and reﬁnance the withdrawn part of the credit for higher
project values. Trigger value µ¤ is given by:
µ¤ = V + r + ¸(WR ¡ r)Φ(
p
c(x¤
R ¡ µ¤)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(WS ¡ r)Φ(
p
b(x¤
S ¡ µ¤)) : (1)
5Since the ﬁnancing structure is exogenous in our model, so that the ﬁrm cannot select a diﬀerent degree of
heterogeneity for each project, it is reasonable to think of the project’s liquidation value less project-speciﬁc
simply as the ﬁrm’s collateral.
6For proof of trigger strategies being the uniquely optimal strategies in such global games, see Morris and
Shin (2004).
7Due to the assumed independence of signals, the proportion of small banks withdrawing their money,
deﬁned as the proportion of banks receiving private signals lower than x
¤
S, is equivalent to the probability with
which any single small bank observes a private signal lower than x
¤
S.6
The relationship bank is indiﬀerent between foreclosing and extending the loan, if
¼R(foreclosejxR) = ¼R(extendjxR)
K = r prob(µ ¸ µ¤jxR)
K = r
µ
1 ¡ Φ
µ
p
a + c
µ
µ¤ ¡
a
a + c
y ¡
c
a + c
xR
¶¶¶
;
which delivers a trigger value for her private signal of
x¤
R =
a + c
c
µ¤ ¡
a
c
y +
p
a + c
c
Φ¡1
µ
K
r
¶
: (2)
Hence, whenever the relationship bank observes a signal xR < x¤
R, she forecloses the loan, but
extends for xR ¸ x¤
R.
Likewise, indiﬀerence for the continuum of small banks is given at
¼S(foreclosejxS) = ¼S(extendjxS)
K = r prob(µ ¸ µ¤jxS)
K = r
µ
1 ¡ Φ
µp
a + b
µ
µ¤ ¡
a
a + b
y ¡
b
a + b
xS
¶¶¶
:
This, in turn, delivers the trigger signal for small banks as
x¤
S =
a + b
b
µ¤ ¡
a
b
y +
p
a + b
b
Φ¡1
µ
K
r
¶
: (3)
Plugging the signal values x¤
R and x¤
S in (1) delivers the equilibrium value for the ﬁrm’s
optimal action as
µ¤ = V + r + ¸(WR ¡ r)Φ
Ã
a
p
c
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
r
a + c
c
Φ¡1
³K
r
´!
+(1 ¡ ¸)(WS ¡ r)Φ
Ã
a
p
b
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
r
a + b
b
Φ¡1
³K
r
´!
: (4)
The equilibrium given by equations (2), (3) and (4) is unique provided that private information
is suﬃciently precise relative to public information about µ, i.e. b;c ¸ a2
2¼.
4 Comparative Statics
From the derived equilibrium we know that the ﬁrm will terminate the project whenever a
project quality lower than µ¤ is realized. However, for all µ · µ < µ¤, where µ is given by
the ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence condition provided that all lenders extend their loans, i.e. µ = V + r,
terminating the project is an ineﬃcient action. Only for lower project qualities, termination
of the project is warranted due to suﬃciently low cash-ﬂows. For values of µ between µ and
µ¤, however, the ﬁrm will terminate the project only because some fraction of debt has been
withdrawn prematurely.7
In the following, we assume that the ﬁrm aims at preventing ineﬃcient project liquidation.
Even though we did not explicitly deﬁne a utility function for the ﬁrm, it is reasonable to
assume that the ﬁrm’s utility is negatively aﬀected by ineﬃcient withdrawal of credit by
its ﬁnanciers and a thereby implicitly forced termination of an illiquid but essentially still
viable project. Hence, as a ﬁrst step towards ﬁnding the optimal policy combination of risk-
taking and information disclosure, we have to analyze the diﬀerent parameters’ inﬂuence on
equilibrium value µ¤. The lower µ¤, the smaller is the range of values µ for which ineﬃcient
project termination may be obtained.8 Before we turn to the impact of riskiness 1=a9 and
precision c of the relationship bank’s information, let us brieﬂy analyze the inﬂuence of the a
priori expected cash-ﬂow, y, and of the relationship lender’s fraction of total ﬁrm debt, ¸, on
trigger value µ¤. Proofs are presented in appendix A.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium value µ¤ decreases in the a priori expected cash-ﬂow of the project,
y. It increases in the relationship bank’s fraction of debt, ¸, whenever reﬁnancing this part of
the loan is suﬃciently costly. It decreases in ¸, however, for low values of WR only if projects
with low (high) expected cash-ﬂows are repaid with low (high) r.
Whenever the a priori expected project cash-ﬂow is high, banks will prefer to extend their
loan in order to reap the credit repayment r instead of conﬁning themselves to the early
liquidation value K. In general, it follows from (2) and (3) that banks will extend their loans
for a larger range of signals, i.e. x¤
R and x¤
S are reduced, the higher the prior expected cash-
ﬂow y and the ﬁnal repayment r and the lower the early liquidation value K is. Interpreting
the impact of ¸ on µ¤ requires considering the strategic behavior of all three types of players:
ﬁrm, relationship bank and arm’s-length banks. The relationship bank may either withdraw
her loan or extend it. If she withdraws, the ﬁrm’s reﬁnancing costs increase in the size of
her loan, ¸, and in the per-capita costs WR. Hence, for suﬃciently high WR, the ﬁrm will
terminate the project for a larger range of project qualities the higher ¸, i.e. @µ¤
@¸ > 0. If
the relationship bank extends her loan, in contrast, a higher ¸ leads to a lower proportion of
(arm’s-length) debt that remains to be coordinated on the eﬃcient action “extend”. Provided
that a suﬃciently large proportion of small banks extends, it will be optimal for the ﬁrm to
proceed with the project, so that µ¤ decreases in ¸. As already stated above, banks will be
more inclined to extend their loans for high values of r. However, once a high repayment
has been oﬀered, the ﬁrm will only be willing to proceed with the project if its cash-ﬂow is
suﬃciently high. Anticipating this reasoning by the ﬁrm, small banks will extend their loans
in that case only if the a priori expected cash-ﬂow, y, is high. For low values of y, in contrast,
banks will tend to withdraw their money early. However, they know that they may still reap
the ﬁnal repayment r, which is always higher than the early liquidation value K, if the ﬁrm
decides not to terminate the project. Even for low project qualities, it will be proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm to do so if repayment r is relatively low. Consequently, small banks are also willing
to extend their loans for projects with low expected cash-ﬂows provided that repayment r is
not too high.
8For µ · µ, terminating the project is the uniquely optimal strategy for the ﬁrm, irrespective of the banks’
actions. As such, trigger value µ
¤ as deﬁned in section 3 cannot fall below µ.
9Note that the riskiness of the ﬁrm’s project refers to the variance of project cash-ﬂows, 1=a, while we
generally denote a as the “risk parameter”. A value of a = 0 therefore characterizes maximum risk, while
a ! 1 describes a policy of zero risk.8
Analyzing the relationship bank’s private information, we ﬁnd that the precision c of her
signal has a distinct inﬂuence on trigger value µ¤. This eﬀect, however, is contingent on the
prior expected cash-ﬂow of the project, y. The same can be shown to be true for the inﬂuence
of parameter a on µ¤.
Proposition 2 Whenever the a priori expected cash-ﬂow of the project is suﬃciently high,
equilibrium value µ¤ increases with more precise information held by the relationship bank
and with higher riskiness 1=a of the project. The opposite holds for suﬃciently low expected
cash-ﬂows.
Let us illustrate the implications of proposition 2 for the case of low expected cash-ﬂows. For
low values of y, banks are generally reluctant to extend credit since there is a fair chance
that the ﬁrm will not invest additional eﬀort because of a too low realized value of µ, so that
credit may not be repaid. However, if a large business risk leads to a high variance of project
cash-ﬂows, the project proﬁt may still turn out to be suﬃciently high, despite the low prior
expected value y. For decreasing values of a, therefore, the banks will decide to roll over
their loans for a larger interval of signal values, so that µ¤ decreases. The same holds if the
relationship bank obtains more precise information. The more precise her private information
becomes, the more she will tend to neglect the informational content of the prior distribution
of µ.10 Since the distribution of her private signal is common knowledge, all other banks know
that she will place more weight on her private signal and rely less on y. As the relationship
bank decides on a considerable fraction ¸ of total ﬁrm debt, it is reasonable for small banks
in this case to neglect y as well. Again, trigger values x¤
S and x¤
R will decrease and hence µ¤
will be reduced.
Even though proposition 2 gives a ﬁrst indication with regard to the inﬂuence of a and c
on the incidence of ineﬃcient project termination via their impact on µ¤, we still have to
overcome two problems in order to ﬁnd the ﬁrm’s optimal policy. First, the results delineated
in proposition 2 relied on a comparison of expected cash-ﬂow y with threshold functions that
are complex functions of a and c (see appendix A). Hence, we did not yet arrive at the absolute
eﬀect of risk and information precision on µ¤. Second, the probability of ineﬃcient project
termination does not only depend on µ¤, but on the probability that the realized project
cash-ﬂow turns out to be lower than µ¤ and hence on the whole distribution of µ. These two
aspects will be dealt with in the subsequent section.
5 Optimal Information Disclosure and Risk-Taking
In the following, we will analyze the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy in order to reduce the probability
of ineﬃcient project liquidation. The ﬁrm hence aims at solving the following optimization
problem:
min
a;c
fprob(µ · µ¤) = Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))g s.t. b;c ¸
a2
2¼
;
where µ¤ is given by (4). Note that we restrict the ﬁrm’s decision to assure uniqueness of
equilibrium.
10Note that the relationship bank’s posterior expectation of µ is given as a weighted average of the prior
expected value y and her private signal value xR: E(µjxR) =
a
a+cy +
c
a+cxR.9
5.1 Optimal Information Precision
The impact of the relationship bank’s information precision, c, on the probability of ineﬃcient
early liquidation depends solely on its eﬀect on µ¤, since
@Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))
@c
= Á(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))
p
a
@µ¤
@c
:
From proposition 2 we know that µ¤ increases in the relationship bank’s information precision c
whenever the a priori expected cash-ﬂow y is suﬃciently high. Stated diﬀerently, the condition
(see appendix A) requires µ¤ to be smaller than
y ¡
1
p
a + c
Φ¡1
³K
r
´
: (5)
For µ¤ larger than the above threshold, equilibrium value µ¤ decreases in c. In order to ﬁnd the
optimal precision of information, we follow the analysis of Heinemann and Metz (2002). Yet
in contrast to this earlier study, we allow for two diﬀerent cases: since small- to medium-sized
ﬁrms typically dispose of only small collateral, whereas larger ﬁrms may be provided with a
much higher amount of collateral, we consider both the cases of K < 1=2r and K > 1=2r.
Generally, it holds that for completely precise information disseminated to the relationship
bank (c ! 1), threshold (5) converges to y, while µ¤ converges to:
µ¤(c ! 1) = V + r + ¸(WR ¡ r)
K
r
+(1 ¡ ¸)(WS ¡ r)Φ
Ã
a
p
b
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
r
a + b
b
Φ¡1
³K
r
´
!
= µc
0 :
By committing to a disclosure of fully precise information to the relationship bank, the ﬁrm
can always achieve an equilibrium value of µ¤ = µc
0. In the following analysis, we will therefore
diﬀerentiate between low expected cash-ﬂows (y < µc
0) and high expected cash-ﬂows (y >
µc
0). Note that a minimum value for c is given by the condition that ensures uniqueness of
equilibrium, i.e. c ¸ a2
2¼ = cmin.
Case 1: K > 1=2r
When the ﬁrm possesses suﬃciently large collateral, it follows that Φ¡1(K=r) > 0. Hence, for
c ! 1, threshold (5) converges to y from below. Let us ﬁrst analyze the case of low expected
cash-ﬂow, i.e. y < µc
0. Since µ¤ is decreasing whenever µ¤ > y ¡ 1=
p
a + c Φ¡1(K=r), we
ﬁnd that µ¤ decreases in c for the whole range of parameter values. Hence, the ﬁrm can
minimize the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation by providing its relationship bank
with completely precise information.
If, in contrast, expected cash-ﬂow is high, so that y > µc
0, the following situation is
obtained (see Fig. 1): For low precision values c, equilibrium value µ¤ will be higher than
the threshold function (5), so that µ¤ is decreasing in c. Once µ¤ equals the threshold (5),
a minimum is reached and µ¤ starts increasing along with c for higher precision values. The
minimum value of µ¤ is obtained for a precision value denoted ˜ c, where the two curves cross.10
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Figure 1: K > 1=2r and y > µc
0
However, in order to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium, we require c to be at least as high as
cmin = a2=(2¼). The optimal precision value c¤ in this case is therefore given as
c¤ =
8
<
:
a2
2¼ if cmin > ˜ c
˜ c if cmin · ˜ c
where ˜ c is the precision value for which µ¤(c) = y ¡ 1=
p
a + cΦ¡1(K=r).
Case 2: K < 1=2r
For K < 1=2r, threshold (5) converges to y from above, since Φ¡1(K=r) < 0. If the market
expects low cash-ﬂows, so that y < µc
0, the ﬁrm’s optimal information policy is either to
distribute completely precise information to the relationship bank or to decrease information
precision to its minimally necessary level, as can be seen from Fig. 2.
If a is suﬃciently low, so that cmin takes on very low values, it might be the case, that
µ¤(cmin) < µc
0, so that it is advantageous for the ﬁrm to distribute as imprecise information
as possible. In any other case, however, the ﬁrm can minimize the probability of ineﬃcient
project liquidation by granting completely precise information to the relationship bank.
From (4) it follows that
µ¤(cmin) = µc
0
p
2¼(µ¤ ¡ y) +
r
2¼ + a
a
Φ¡1
³K
r
´
= Φ¡1
³K
r
´
a =
2¼
µp
2¼(y¡µ¤)
Φ¡1( K
r )
¶2
¡1
= ¯ a :11
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Figure 2: K < 1=2r and y < µc
0
Hence, we ﬁnd that for a < ¯ a the optimal information precision is given by cmin, whereas
for a ¸ ¯ a, the ﬁrm is best oﬀ by providing the relationship bank with completely precise
information, i.e. c ! 1.
If the market holds very optimistic expectations with regard to cash-ﬂow, i.e. y > µc
0, the
optimal information policy is to choose cmin, as the condition for µ¤ increasing in c is always
satisﬁed.
Summing up the results with regard to optimal information disclosure to the relationship
bank, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 For given riskiness 1=a, optimal information disclosure requires to provide
the relationship bank with information of precision as given in Tab. 1.
Table 1: Results regarding optimal information precision
K > 1=2r K < 1=2r
low expected c¤ ! 1 c¤ = cmin for a < ¯ a
cash-ﬂow y c¤ ! 1 for a ¸ ¯ a
high expected c¤ = cmin for ˜ c < cmin c¤ = cmin
cash-ﬂow y c¤ = ˜ c for ˜ c ¸ cmin
Here, cmin = a2=(2¼), ˜ c is implicitly deﬁned by µ¤(˜ c) = y ¡ 1=
p
a + ˜ c Φ¡1(K=r)and ¯ a by
equality of µ¤(cmin) and µc
0.
The results derived so far are in line with the intuition behind proposition 2. In general, it
holds that for high expected cash-ﬂows, the ﬁrm optimally provides the relationship bank12
with minimally precise information. By doing so, the ﬁrm tries to induce the relationship
bank to rely less on her private signal - which, due to the assumed normal distributions, may
turn out quite low after all -, and more strongly on the “optimistic” prior expected cash-ﬂow.
For low expected cash-ﬂows, in contrast, the ﬁrm optimally discloses very precise information,
i.e. she chooses a high value of c relative to a. If a is suﬃciently low, a minimum value of c
is adequate to this end.
Note that in the upper left cell (high K and low y), banks experience the highest incentive to
foreclose their loans early, while the ﬁrm has the highest incentive to terminate the project.
In the lower right cell (low K and high y) the opposite holds. This explains the clear-cut
results concerning the optimal precision values in these cases. However, we can already see
that the optimal information disclosure to the relationship bank is not entirely independent
of the chosen business risk. For lowly-collateralized ﬁrms this is the case for projects with low
expected cash-ﬂows, for highly-collateralized ﬁrms for projects with high expected cash-ﬂows.
As already indicated, banks have a lower incentive to withdraw their loans prematurely for
low values of K. Hence, there is less “persuasion” necessary to avoid early liquidation. For
low values of K, therefore, even pessimistic expectations over y (upper right cell) do not
necessarily require maximal precision c as long as the variance of cash-ﬂows is suﬃciently
high (i.e. low a). Since high risk enables the realization of a high cash-ﬂow µ despite low
expectation y, banks may still anticipate project continuation and do not have to be distracted
from pessimistic prior expectations.
For high K, in contrast, banks experience a high incentive to withdraw their loans prematurely.
In case of high expected cash-ﬂows (lower left cell), it may be optimal, however, to induce
the relationship bank not to disregard her private information completely, i.e. disclose private
information of higher than minimal precision. This is the case for high risk, i.e. low a and
hence low cmin. Here, the project cash-ﬂow may turn out quite low despite the optimistic
prior expectation. Hence, it will be advantageous for the ﬁrm if banks do not base their
actions too strongly on the prior expectation y.
5.2 Optimal Risk-Taking by the Firm
Given that the ﬁrm has already decided on the optimal precision of information to be disclosed
to its relationship bank, we now examine the optimal degree of riskiness, 1=a, that the ﬁrm
should choose for its project. In particular, we are interested in potential eﬀects of the “degree
of heterogeneity”, ¸, on the optimal value of a.
In contrast to precision parameter c, risk parameter a inﬂuences the probability of ineﬃcient
project termination in two ways, as can be seen from the term in brackets in the following
derivative:
@prob(µ · µ¤)
@a
= Á(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))
·
1
2
p
a
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
p
a
@µ¤
@a
¸
: (6)
Hence, in order to minimize the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation, the ﬁrm not only
has to be concerned with the impact of a on µ¤, but also with the diﬀerence between µ¤ and
the expected cash-ﬂow y.
Analyzing the ﬁrm’s optimal business risk, we again have to consider diﬀerent cases regarding
the value of K relative to r and the a priori expected cash-ﬂow y.13
Case 1: K > 1=2r
If expected cash-ﬂow is low, i.e. y < µc
0, we know that the relationship bank should
optimally be provided with completely precise information: c¤ ! 1. Examining the extreme
values of a, i.e. either maximum risk (a = 0) or zero risk (a ! 1), while taking into account
the optimal information policy, the equilibrium values of µ¤ are given by:
µ¤(c ! 1;a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[¸(WH ¡ r) + (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)]
and
µ¤(c ! 1;a ! 1) = V + r + ¸(WH ¡ r)
K
r
+ (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r) : (7)
Equation (7) is derived using the fact that the second term in (4) can also be expressed as
(1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Φ( a p
b(µ¤ ¡ y) +
pa
b + 1 Φ¡1(K
r )) = (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Φ(a[ 1 p
b(µ¤ ¡ y) +
q
1
ab + 1
a2 Φ¡1(K
r )]). Since µc
0 > y holds for all values of a, it has to hold for a ! 1 as well,
so that the latter term converges to (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Φ(+1) = (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r).
The partial derivative
@µ¤(c!1;a)
@a delivers:
@µ¤(c ! 1;a)
@a
=
(1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Á(¢)[ 1 p
b(µ¤ ¡ y) + 1
2
p
b(a+b)Φ¡1(K
r )]
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Á(¢) a p
b
;
which is positive whenever µ¤(c ! 1;a) > y ¡ 1
2
p
a+bΦ¡1(K
r ). This condition is satisﬁed,
as Φ¡1(K
r ) > 0 for K > 1=2r and y < µc
0. Hence, we know that µ¤ is increasing in a and
µ¤¡y > 0, so that according to (6) the probability of ineﬃcient project termination increases
in a. The optimal riskiness for a ﬁrm’s business project calls for a¤¤ = 0, i.e. maximum risk,
in this case.11 The ex-ante probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation is thereby reduced to
a level of 1=2.
If, in contrast, expected cash-ﬂow y is high, i.e. y > µc
0, the optimal value of information
precision is given as either c¤ = cmin or c¤ = ˜ c.
Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the case of c¤ = cmin. Here, the equilibrium value µ¤ for a = 0 is
given by
µ¤(cmin;a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[¸(WH ¡ r) + (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)] = µ¤(c;a = 0) :
We know that µ¤(c ! 1;a) < y for all a. Hence it also holds for a = 0. µ¤(c;a = 0), however,
is independent of c. Therefore, it must be the case that µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y as well.
11We use the “double star” (a
¤¤) as indication that this value of a minimizes the probability of ineﬃcient
project liquidation by taking into account both the eﬀect of a on µ
¤ and the diﬀerence between µ
¤ and y. In
contrast, a
¤ refers to the value of a that minimizes µ
¤.14
For the partial derivative of µ¤(cmin;a) with respect to a, we ﬁnd:
@µ¤(cmin;a)
@a
=
1
1 ¡ ¸(WH ¡ r)Á1(¢)
p
2¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Á2(¢) a p
b
¢
·
¡¸(WH ¡ r)Á1(¢)
¼
a2
r
a
2¼ + a
Φ¡1
³K
r
´
+(1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Á2(¢)
h 1
p
b
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
1
2b
r
b
a + b
Φ¡1
³K
r
´i¸
;
where Á1(¢) = Á(
p
2¼(µ¤ ¡ y) + Φ¡1(K
r )) and Á2(¢) = Á( a p
b(µ¤ ¡ y) +
q
a+b
b Φ¡1(K
r )). This
partial derivative is positive, if µ¤ is higher than
y +
"
¸(WH ¡ r)Á1(¢)¼
p
b
(1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)Á2(¢)
p
a3(2¼ + a)
¡
1
2
p
a + b
#
Φ¡1
³K
r
´
: (8)
What happens to threshold (8) for a ! 1? As long as
¸ >
(WSB ¡ r)Á2(¢)
p
a3(2¼a)
(WH ¡ r)Á1(¢)2¼
p
b(a + b) + (WSB ¡ r)Á2(¢)
p
a3(2¼ + a)
= ¯ ¸ ;
threshold (8) converges to y from above, since the term in brackets is positive and Φ¡1(K=r) >
0 in the case considered.
Fig. 3 in the appendix exempliﬁes the behavior of µ¤(cmin;a) for the case of ¸ > ¯ ¸.12 The
value of a that reduces µ¤ is given by a¤ ! 1, as µ¤(cmin;a) decreases in a. Since µ¤ < y, we
also know that
@prob(µ·µ¤)
@a < 0, so that the value of a that minimizes the overall probability
of ineﬃcient project liquidation is given by a¤¤ ! 1.
For ¸ · ¯ ¸, however, threshold (8)converges to y from below. Here, we have to distinguish two
cases: either µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y < µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) or µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) < µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y.
In the ﬁrst case we ﬁnd that a¤ = 0 as given in Fig. 4, where, due to the fact that
@µ¤(cmin;a)
@a > 0
and µ¤ > y, it holds that
@prob(µ·µ¤)
@a > 0 and consequently a¤¤ = 0.
Alternatively, the optimal value of business risk will be given by a¤¤ ! 1, if µ¤(cmin;a !
1) < µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y, as can be seen from Fig. 5. Here, µ¤ decreases in a for suﬃciently
high values of a and µ¤ < y, so that
@prob(µ·µ¤)
@a < 0 and hence projects with zero risk (a¤¤ !
1) will minimize the probability of ineﬃcient liquidation provided that the relationship bank
disposes of information with minimal precision.
Whenever optimal information precision is given by ˜ c, we ﬁnd that for the extreme values of
a the equilibrium value µ¤ is given by
µ¤(˜ c;a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[¸(WH ¡ r) + (1 ¡ ¸)(WSB ¡ r)]
and
µ¤(˜ c;a ! 1) = y :
12The following ﬁgures will be displayed in appendix B.15
Generally, the partial derivative is given as
@µ¤(˜ c;a)
@a
=
1
p
(a + ˜ c)3Φ¡1
³K
r
´
> 0 :
Since µ¤(˜ c;a) · y, while the partial derivative is positive, the optimal value of a must be
an interior solution. Plugging the partial derivative in (6), the impact of a on the overall
probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation is given by
@Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))
@a
= Á(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y))
·
1
2
p
a
(µ¤ ¡ y) +
r
a
(a + c)3Φ¡1
³K
r
´¸
:
The value a¤¤ that minimizes this probability, is then found as a¤¤ = ˜ c.
Summarizing the diﬀerent results for this case of high collateral K, we ﬁnd the following:
² For c¤ = cmin:
– For suﬃciently high ¸, optimal business risk is characterized by a¤¤ ! 1, so that
the probability of ineﬃcient project termination amounts to Φ(¡1) = 0, since
µ¤ < y.
– For suﬃciently low ¸, optimal business risk is achieved with a¤¤ = 0 and leads to
a probability of ineﬃcient project termination of Φ(0) = 1
2.
² For c¤ = ˜ c, the optimal value of a is given by a¤¤ = ˜ c, so that Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y)) =
Φ(
q
˜ c
2Φ¡1(K
r )).
Hence, for a suﬃciently high degree of relationship banking (i.e. for suﬃciently high ¸),
optimal ﬁrm policy is described by c¤ = cmin and a¤¤ ! 1, since in this case cmin > ˜ c. For
a low degree of relationship banking, in contrast, the ﬁrm will prefer a policy combination of
c¤ = a¤¤ = ˜ c. The policy mix of c¤ = cmin and a¤¤ = 0 is ruled out, since for this value of a it
holds that cmin < ˜ c, so that the optimal precision value is instead given by ˜ c, as follows from
proposition 3.
Case 2: K < 1=2r
Let us ﬁrst analyze the case of low expected cash-ﬂow, i.e. y < µc
0. For a < ¯ a, optimal
information precision for the relationship bank is given by c¤ = cmin, whereas for a ¸ ¯ a,
optimal precision is given by c¤ ! 1.
If we ﬁrst concentrate on the case of c¤ = cmin, we know that due to the assumption of
y < µc
0 also µ¤(cmin;a = 0) > y. Again, it holds that µ¤(cmin;a) increases in a whenever µ¤ is
higher than threshold (8). Since in the current case it is assumed that K < 1=2r, however,
the threshold will converge to y from below for a ! 1 whenever ¸ > ¯ ¸. It can therefore
be shown that µ¤(cmin;a) increases in a and, since µ¤ > y, also the overall probability of
ineﬃcient project termination increases in a, so that the optimal risk parameter is given by
a¤¤ = 0.
For ¸ < ¯ ¸, however, threshold (8) converges to y from above. Again, two diﬀerent possibilities
arise. Either µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) < y < µ¤(cmin;a = 0), so that µ¤ decreases in a. Since here16
µ¤ < y for suﬃciently low a, the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation is minimized by
selecting a project risk characterized by a¤¤ ! 1.
Alternatively, the case of y < µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) could arise as shown in Fig.
6 . Since in this case µ¤ > y and a¤ = ˜ a1, an intermediate value of a might minimize the
overall probability of ineﬃcient project termination.
For a > ¯ a, in contrast, the optimal precision of information is given by c¤ ! 1. We know
that µ¤(c ! 1;a) increases in a whenever µ¤ > y ¡ 1=(2
p
a + b) Φ¡1(K=r). For a ! 1,
this threshold converges to y from above, since K < 1=2r. Again we have to diﬀerentiate
between two diﬀerent scenarios. Either µ¤(c ! 1;a ! 1) < y < µ¤(c ! 1;a = 0), so that
the optimal risk parameter is given by a¤¤ ! 1, since µ¤ < y for a ! 1. Alternatively,
y < µ¤(c ! 1;a = 0) < µ¤(c ! 1;a ! 1), so that Fig. 7 is obtained. Again, an
intermediate solution a¤¤ might be optimal.
Summing up the results for this case, we ﬁnd the following:
² For a < ¯ a, the optimal information precision is given by c¤ = cmin.
– For ¸ > ¯ ¸ optimal riskiness is characterized by a¤¤ = 0. The prior probability of
ineﬃcient project termination is thereby reduced to a value of 1=2.
– For ¸ < ¯ ¸, the probability of ineﬃcient project termination can be minimized by
choosing a riskiness described by a¤¤ ! 1. Since µ¤ < y in this case, Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡
y)) = 0, which is the best result achievable.
² For a ¸ ¯ a, optimal information precision is given by c¤ ! 1. Choosing a¤¤ ! 1
minimizes the probability of project liquidation since µ¤ < y in this case, so that
Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y)) = 0. Again, since this is the lowest level that can be achieved, in-
termediate values of a do not have to be considered as alternative solutions.
Let us ﬁnally consider the case where expected cash-ﬂow is high, i.e. y > µc
0. The optimal
information precision is given by c¤ = cmin. µ¤(cmin;a) increases in a whenever µ¤ is higher
than threshold (8). For ¸ > ¯ ¸ and a ! 1, threshold (8) converges to y from below, as can
be seen in Fig. 8. Here, we have assumed that µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y < µ¤(cmin;a ! 1). As
follows quite obviously since @µ¤
@a > 0 and µ¤ > y, the optimal risk value is given by a¤¤ = 0.
If, in contrast, µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) < µ¤(cmin;a ! 1) < y, µ¤ is decreasing in a while at the
same time µ¤ < y, so that the overall optimal value of a is given by a¤¤ ! 1.
For ¸ < ¯ ¸, instead, threshold (8) converges to y from above. Since µ¤(cmin;a = 0) < y and
µ¤ decreases in a, the prior probability of ineﬃcient project termination can be minimized by
selecting minimum business risk: a¤¤ ! 1. Hence for both low and high values of ¸, the
probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation can be minimized by conducting a policy with
parameters c¤ = cmin and a¤¤ ! 1, so that Φ(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y)) = 0.13
The following proposition combines the results with respect to optimal risk-taking and infor-
mation disclosure.
13Choosing maximum risk. i.e. a
¤¤ = 0, for ¸ > ¯ ¸ would reduce the ex-ante probability of project liquidation
to a value of 1=2. A risk policy of a
¤¤ ! 1 is therefore more eﬃcient and should be preferred.17
Proposition 4 Optimal risk-taking and information disclosure depend on the ratio of the
ﬁrm’s collateral K to repayment r and on the expected cash-ﬂow y. Additionally, the optimal
policy mix is inﬂuenced by the fraction of relationship lending as compared to arm’s-length
lending and hence by the degree of heterogeneity in bank ﬁnancing. The full results are depicted
in Tab. 2.
Table 2: Results regarding optimal information precision and business risk
K > 1=2r K < 1=2r
low expected c¤ ! 1 ¸ > ¯ ¸ : c¤ = cmin
cash-ﬂow a¤¤ = 0 a¤¤ = 0
y < µc
0 ) Φ(0) = 1=2 ) Φ(0) = 1=2
¸ < ¯ ¸ : c¤ = a¤¤ ! 1
) Φ(¡1) = 0
high expected ¸ > ¯ ¸ : c¤ = cmin c¤ = cmin
cash-ﬂow a¤¤ ! 1 a¤¤ ! 1
y > µc
0 ) Φ(¡1) = 0 ) Φ(¡1) = 0
¸ < ¯ ¸ : c¤ = a¤¤ = ˜ c
) Φ(
q
˜ c
2Φ¡1(K
r ))
Both ﬁrms with small and those with large collateral are aﬀected by heterogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing with regard to their optimal risk-taking and information disclosure decisions.
For ﬁrms with low collateral, which are likely to be small- to medium-sized ﬁrms, the degree
of heterogeneity among involved banks is decisive if projects with low expected cash-ﬂows
have to be ﬁnanced. Whenever the proportion of debt obtained from the relationship bank is
high, the ﬁrm will take on maximum risk and provide the relationship bank with information
of only minimal precision. With this policy combination, ﬁrms create maximum uncertainty
about their business projects, since the relationship bank will tend to neglect her (imprecise)
private information and also the remaining small share of arm’s-length lending will coordinate
more strongly on the prior information about the cash-ﬂow distribution. Due to the maximal
variance of µ, the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation is then reduced to a level of 1=2.
If relationship lending makes up only a small proportion of the full credit amount, however,
a large remaining share of small bank lenders has to be coordinated on the eﬃcient action
“extend credit”. Here, the ﬁrm will optimally choose minimum risk for its business project
while at the same time disclosing fully precise information to the relationship bank. By doing
so, the ﬁrm induces all banks to disregard the unfavorable prior information y, so that the
ex-ante incidence of project termination can be eliminated. For projects with high expected
cash-ﬂows, the ﬁrm will not make her optimal policy contingent on the size of relationship
lending. In this case, the incentive to withdraw credit early is so low that the ﬁrm optimally
chooses minimum risk and provides the relationship bank with fully precise information (since
for a ! 1, also cmin ! 1).
Large ﬁrms, that typically dispose of high collateral, in contrast, vary their optimal risk-
taking along with the relationship bank’s proportion of total ﬁrm debt for projects with high18
expected cash-ﬂows. Here, we ﬁnd that for a high degree of relationship lending, the ﬁrm
will refuse to take on any risk and will keep its relationship bank fully informed, thereby
eliminating the ex-ante incidence of early liquidation, while it will raise optimal business risk
to an intermediate level and decreases information precision if relationship lending makes up
only a small proportion of total ﬁrm debt. In the latter case, a relatively large proportion of
arm’s-length banks has to be coordinated on the eﬃcient action, which is easier to conduct,
the more strongly the relationship bank takes into account the prior expected cash-ﬂow value,
y. Hence, the precision of information disclosure to the relationship bank has to be reduced
as compared to the case of a low proportion of relationship lending. For projects with low
expected cash-ﬂows, however, the incentive to withdraw credit early is so large that the ﬁrm
optimally decides on maximum risk and provides its relationship bank with completely precise
information. This policy combination provides a gamble for resurrection and reduces the ex-
ante probability of ineﬃcient liquidation to 1=2.
Whereas comparisons to the case of homogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing show that large
ﬁrms cannot increase eﬃciency, heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing may put lowly-collate-
ralized ﬁrms at an advantage. Interestingly, the latter ﬁrms seem to beneﬁt from a heteroge-
neous system particularly when conducting projects with low expected cash-ﬂows. However,
the degree of relationship lending must not become too large. Otherwise eﬃciency is reduced.
Obviously, therefore, small ﬁrms beneﬁt from relationship banking in situations of imminent
distress but suﬀer from a potential hold-up problem that is aggravated by the relationship
bank’s ﬁnancial power as mirrored by her fraction of total ﬁrm debt.
6 Conclusion
Our study underlines the importance of the ﬁnancing system when analyzing ﬁrms’ risk-taking
and information disclosure. Earlier work on this subject, with limited focus on ﬁrms with large
collateral, found that in a system of homogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing ﬁrms maximize risk
for projects with low expected cash-ﬂows, but choose minimum risk for projects with high
expected cash-ﬂows. In either case, they disclose fully precise information. It has been argued
that by doing so ﬁrms try to gamble for resurrection in the case of sinister business prospects,
but attempt to lock-in good expectations in the opposite case.
In a context of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing, optimal ﬁrm decisions are more multi-
faceted. We can show that ﬁrms adjust their optimal risk-taking and information disclosure
to the heterogeneity of their bank ﬁnancing. The adjustment, however, is asymmetric when
comparing lowly- and highly-collateralized ﬁrms. In this respect, the former vary their optimal
decisions along with the degree of relationship banking for projects with low expected cash-
ﬂows, while the latter do so for projects with high expected cash-ﬂows.
Comparing the resulting degrees of eﬃciency from the diﬀerent ﬁrm decisions we ﬁnd that
the highest gains in eﬃciency can be made if highly-collateralized ﬁrms employ a high degree
of relationship banking, while lowly-collateralized ﬁrms rely on a low degree of relationship
banking. Taking into account that highly-collateralized ﬁrms may obtain an equivalent de-
gree of eﬃciency when borrowing from homogeneous multiple lenders as has been shown by
Heinemann and Metz (2002), our results may also be interpreted as matching observed ﬁ-
nancing patterns. Large ﬁrms are often found to obtain ﬁnancing from the capital markets19
rather than turning to the banking system. Since the capital markets consist of a continuum
of homogeneous multiple lenders, this type of ﬁnancing, according to our results, delivers the
highest degree of eﬃciency to these ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms, in contrast, are often found to ﬁnance
mainly via banks. Contrary to the early literature on relationship lending, however, even
small ﬁrms hold credit relations to more than one bank. Provided that the degree of rela-
tionship banking as compared to arm’s-length ﬁnancing is not too large, again, this ﬁnancing
regime supposedly delivers the lowest ex-ante probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation to
those lowly-collateralized ﬁrms.References
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Again, the denominator is positive. It is then easy to see that the numerator and hence
the partial derivative itself is positive whenever WR > r + (WS ¡ r)
Φb(¢)
Φc(¢) and negative if
WR < r+(WS¡r)
Φb(¢)
Φc(¢). In the latter case, we also have to take into account that 0 · r < WS <
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Φc(¢) requires a suﬃciently high repayment r since it
has to hold that WR > WS.
Q.E.D.
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Since under the stated assumptions the denominator is positive, the partial derivative is
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